

TOP SECRET

4 March 1961

Copy No. C 80

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600040001-5

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600040001-5

4 March 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

3. Britain and France reviewing policy on Communist China. (*Page ii*)

4. Communist China negotiating for additional grain purchases. (*Page ii*)

25X1

7. Morocco: National Union of Popular Forces will press for establishment of parliamentary democracy. (*Page iv*)

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

25X1

Britain - France - Communist China: (The American Embassy in London believes that the Macmillan government will find it difficult to continue to support the moratorium on the question of Chinese representation in the UN this year. The government assumes that Communist China will inevitably be voted into UN membership this year or soon thereafter, replacing Taiwan in both the General Assembly and Security Council. In the embassy's view, the Macmillan government further believes that it has become impossible successfully to attach any conditions to the seating of Peiping. The embassy concludes that recent public statements by Foreign Secretary Home and others are part of a British initiative designed to secure United States acquiescence to the shift in seats.)

25X1

Queried about the French position by the US Embassy in Paris, a Foreign Ministry official said his government will probably soon undertake a high-level review of French policy on diplomatic recognition of Communist China and Chinese representation in the United Nations. He denied, however, that any shift in the French position is imminent. In the past, Peiping's support of the Algerian rebels has been a major stumbling block, but Foreign Ministry officials are now considering whether a French ambassador in Peiping would be useful for influencing the representatives of new French-speaking African states which have recognized Communist China or may do so.

(Backup,
Page 3)

Communist China: Peiping is negotiating additional grain purchases with Australia, Canada, and Argentina which may result in new orders for as much as two million tons. The Chinese have already purchased about \$200,000,000 worth of food-stuffs in recent months, including about three million tons of food grains. Peiping has undertaken a variety of emergency measures, such as selling silver bullion and securing short-term credits from Hong Kong banks, to ease the pressure of

4 Mar 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

these purchases on its foreign currency resources. Although there has been speculation that the USSR has advanced a hard currency loan to China to cover the emergency grain imports, there is no reliable evidence that such financial backing has been arranged. However, Sino-Soviet economic talks, which have been under way in Peiping since early February, may result in an accommodation designed to ease the Chinese balance of payments with the USSR by rescheduling Peiping's debt repayments. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

4 Mar 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Morocco: [REDACTED] Former Premier Abdallah Ibrahim, a leader of the left-wing National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), has indicated his organization will give King Hassan II "some two weeks" to initiate steps leading toward the establishment of a parliamentary democracy. One such step would be to set a date for the election of a national assembly to draft a constitution. Ibrahim indicated that the left would "hit the King hard" on his first "misstep" and stated that such opposition "could go as far as civil war."

[REDACTED]

OK

25X1

25X1

4 Mar 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

[REDACTED]

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

[REDACTED]

Western Positions on Communist China and the UN

[The Macmillan government's public position remains as stated by Lord Home in the House of Lords on 8 February. He argued that despite Peiping's lack of credentials as a peace-loving government, "the facts of international life require that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations." He added that Britain had supported the moratorium only because the choice had been "between the admission of Communist China and the breakup of the United Nations. So long as that was the choice there was only one answer."]

[Britain's grudging support of the moratorium has come under increasingly heavy fire from the Labor opposition, from many Conservative MPs, and from public opinion generally. Noting that the policy conflicts with Britain's 11-year-old recognition of Peiping, where a chargé is maintained, the government's critics find the issue a most popular one on which to belabor American Far Eastern policy and to charge British subservience to Washington. The British preoccupation with achieving a disarmament agreement provides powerful support for the argument that Communist China's isolation from the international community should be reduced. British officials tend to believe that bringing Peiping into contact with pacifying influences in the UN might lessen the chances of an attack on Taiwan or other areas. The British also desire to get more closely in step with African and Asian members of the Commonwealth, whose leaders will participate in the prime ministers' meetings opening in London on Wednesday, 8 March.]

[The American Embassy, as a result of its detailed examination of the British position, concludes that the British have anticipated that the new US administration might make some changes in US China policy, and want to appear to have influenced Washington rather than to have followed "obediently" behind.]

[The French Foreign Ministry official in charge of Chinese affairs stated on 21 February that the British attitude as stated]

25X1

{by Lord Home was unlikely to change the French Government's opposition to seating Peiping. He indicated, however, that Paris was going to restudy the question. He himself believed that the situation within the UN was changing, although he felt that Communist China would probably spoil its own chances of admission by demanding unacceptable preconditions.}

{Official circles in Paris apparently feel that the British experience in recognizing Communist China has been disappointing and that there is little likelihood of a major expansion of trade possibilities. If at some future date De Gaulle decides that to recognize Peiping would give France an advantage in its over-all power position, he would face no serious domestic opposition to doing so. Propaganda activity in support of Communist China is being stepped up in France. The Sino-French Friendship Society reportedly feels that its campaign in favor of official recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations has made enough progress to warrant extending its drive into the French provinces. The New China News Agency also plans increased activity in France. The prominent Paris weekly L' Express, which has hitherto concentrated on criticizing the Algerian war, is running a series of pro-Peiping articles by the non-Communist leftist political leader Francois Mitterrand about his visit to China and his interview with Mao Tse-tung.}

{Other countries are reconsidering their position. The new Quadros administration recently announced that Brazil will support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at its next session. Malayan Premier Rahman, according to an unconfirmed report, plans to vote for the admission of Communist China next September. While Canada is reviewing its support of the moratorium, a preliminary paper on the subject contains no recommendation for a change in position.}

{Taipei retained its seat in the UN last fall by the slimmest margin since 1951; 42 members supported the moratorium, 34 voted against, and 22--mostly African and Asian members--abstained.}

25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET